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COMMENTS
BOTTOMS v. BOTTOMS: A COMMENT
DOUGLAS A. STEINBERG*
The Virginia Court of Appeals decision in Bottoms v. Bottoms1
stands as an important affirmation of the rights of gay and lesbian
parents throughout the country. According to some estimates,
there are three million gay or lesbian parents in the United
States, with eight to ten million children being raised in gay or
lesbian households. 2 Whatever the exact number, many gay and
lesbian parents feel that they have developed a "comfort zone"
of acceptability in the court system.3
One year ago, however, a trial court judge in rural Virginia
reminded these parents that they may not always get the same
treatment as their heterosexual counterparts.4 In September 1993
the Circuit Court for Henrico County ruled that, because Sharon
Bottoms was involved in a homosexual relationship that was
illegal under Virginia law, she was an unfit parent as a matter
of law.5 Custody of Sharon's only child, Tyler, was awarded to
Sharon's mother, Kay Bottoms.6
* J.D. Candidate 1995, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
B.S. 1990, University of Wisconsin at Madison. The author would like to thank the
Servicemembers' Legal Defense Fund and J. Connell for their support and assistance.
1. 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508,
1629 (1989) (citing ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Ezperts, 13 Faro.
L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513 (Aug. 25, 1987)); see also Sue Anne Pressley & Nancy Andrews,
For Gay Couples, the Nursery Becomes the New Frontier, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1992, at
Al (estimating that eight to ten million children are being raised by four million gay
men and lesbians); Can Gays Make Good Parents? (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 29,
1992) (estimating that 5000 children are born to lesbian mothers each year).
3. See Nan Hunter & Nancy Polikoff, Custody Rights and Lesbian Mothers: Legal
Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REv. 691, 714-15 (1976); Steve Susoeff, Assessing
Children's Best Interest When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody
Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852, 859-60 (1985).
4. See Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee". Bottoms v. Bottoms
and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 289-
90 (1994). See generally Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a
Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 513 (1993) (discussing
discrimination against lesbians in custody disputes).
5. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
6. Id. at 280.
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The resulting legal battle that quickly captured national atten-
tion had its roots in rural Henrico County, Virginia. Sharon
Bottoms married Tyler's father, Dennis Doustou, in December
1989 and was divorced in 1991 while pregnant with Tyler.7 The
final divorce decree awarded Sharon full custody of Tyler.8 In
May 1992 Sharon developed a relationship with a woman, April
Wade.9 While involved in this relationship, Sharon and Tyler
regularly visited Kay's house. In January 1993, however, Sharon
informed Kay that she and Tyler would visit Kay's house less
frequently; Sharon told Kay that Kay's live-in boyfriend had
sexually abused her as a child and she feared that Tyler could
also become a victim of abuse.10
In response, Kay Bottoms petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court of Henrico County for custody of Tyler,
alleging that Sharon was an unfit parent because of her lesbian
relationship.", In March 1993, basing its decision on Sharon's
lesbian relationship, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
ordered that custody be transferred from Sharon to Kay. 2 Sharon
appealed the ruling and was granted de novo review in the
Circuit Court of Henrico County. 3
The circuit court awarded custody to Kay Bottoms and granted
Sharon visitation rights on Mondays and Tuesdays.14 The judge
ruled that, as a condition of Sharon's visitation rights, April
Wade could not be present during Sharon's visits with Tyler.15
The court based the ruling on the uncontested fact that Sharon
was involved in a lesbian relationship and had kissed and patted
April in the presence of Tyler. 6 Although the trial judge stated
that there was no specific case on point, he relied on the Virginia
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Roe 7 in concluding that Sharon's
conduct was both illegal and immoral and rendered her per se
7. Id. at 278.
8. Id.
9. Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App.
1994) (No. 1930-93-2).
10. Id at 3.
11. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
12. Opening Brief of Appellant at 3, Bottom (No. 1930-93-2).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Bottom, 444 S.E.2d at 280.
15. Id. at 279. The trial judge also decided that Tyler could not visit Sharon in her
home, regardless of whether April was present. Opening Brief of Appellant at 5. Bottom
(No. 1930-93-2).
16. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
17. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
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unfit to have custody. 18 In addition to Sharon's relationship, the
trial court considered unrebutted evidence that Sharon cursed in
Tyler's presence and made Tyler stand in a corner as a form of
punishment. 19
I. PARENTS' RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA BEFORE BOTTOMS
A. The Rights of Parents in General in Virginia
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized and
protected parents' relationships with their children.20 In Stanley
v. Illinois,2' the Supreme Court held that the care and custody
of one's child is a fundamental constitutional right; state inter-
ference in the relationship can be justified only by a compelling
state interest.22 Virginia courts have followed the lead of the
Supreme Court, and have a long-standing legal tradition of pro-
tecting the sanctity of parent-child relationships.0 In Walker v.
Brooks,2 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that "as between a
natural parent and a third party, the rights of the parent are, if
at all possible, to be respected, such rights being founded upon
natural justice and wisdom, and being essential to the peace,
order, virtue, and happiness of society."25 The court had previ-
ously stated in Judd v. Van Horn 6 that "the law presumes that
the child's best interests will be served when in-the custody of
18. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
19. Id.
20. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (guaranteeing the liberty to establish
a home and bring up a child); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding
that before a state may completely sever the rights of parents to their natural child, due
process requires that the state prove permanent neglect by clear and convincing evidence);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unwed father is entitled to a
hearing to determine his. fitness as a parent before losing custody of his children); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the custody, care, and nurturing of
the child reside first in the parent whose primary function may not be supplanted or
hindered by the state).
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 658 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. See Merritt v. Swimely. 82 Va. 433 (1886) (deciding that legal rights of parents
are essential to the peace, order, virtue, and happiness of society); see also Williams v.
Williams, 66 S.E.2d 500 (Va. 1951) (holding that the rights of the parent, being founded
on nature, are to be respected unless abandoned or relinquished); Sutton v. Menges, 44
S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1947) (holding that a natural parent has greater rights to his or her
natural children than grandparents).
24. 124 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1968).
25. Id. at 198.
26. 81 S.E.2d 432 (Va. 1954).
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its parent."' ' The presumption for parental custody may be re-
butted only if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
custody with a parent has a direct adverse effect on the child.28
The burden of showing the existence of circumstances that would
deprive a parent of the right to custody is on the party opposing
this right.2
If a party rebuts the presumption of parental custody, Virginia
law requires courts to make a further determination: the best
interests of the child. That is, "the parental and non-parental
parties stand equally before the court, with no presumption in
favor of either, and the question is the determination of the best
interests of the child."30 Considering these formidable hurdles
established by the appellate decisions, it is difficult to imagine
many sets of circumstances in which the courts of Virginia would
pierce the presumption of parental custody.31
B. Gay and Lesbian Parents' Rights in Virginia Before
Bottoms
In recent history, the Virginia Supreme Court has ruled on
only two cases involving the rights of gay and lesbian parents
in custody disputes.3 2 In Doe v. Doe,3 the Virginia Supreme Court
refused to adopt a per se rule of unfitness for gay or lesbian
27. Id. at 436.
28. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973). Virginia law enumerates
five circumstances that rebut the presumption of parental custody. These circumstances
are as follows: parental unfitness, Forbes v. Haney, 133 S.E.2d 533 (Va. 1963); prior order
of divestiture, McEntire v. Redfearn, 227 S.E.2d 741 (Va. 1976); voluntary relinquishment,
Shortridge v. Deel, 299 S.E.2d 741 (Va. 1976); abandonment, Patrick v. Byerley, 325 S.E.2d
99 (Va. 1985); and special circumstances that constitute an extraordinary reason to remove
the child, Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986).
29. Judd, 81 S.E.2d at 436.
30. Walker v. Fagg, 400 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. Pond, 360
S.E.2d 885 (Va. Ct. App. 1987)).
31. See Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing a trial court's
decision to award custody of a child to her grandparents due to a lack of evidence that
the child would be adversely affected by living in the residence of her step-father, who
had killed the child's father); see also Phillips v. Kiraly, 105 S.E.2d 855 (Va. 1958)
(permitting a father, who took photographs 'of nude women and had been a "peeping
tom," continued custody of his child); Walker v. Fagg, 400 S.E.2d 208 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding a custody award to a father convicted of killing his wife and the mother of
both of his children; although the father was found unfit, the court still awarded custody
based on the best interests of the child); Ferris v. Underwood, 348 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct.
App. 1986) (awarding custody to a mother even though there was evidence that the
mother's sister, a prostitute, frequently visited the house while the child was present).
32. Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981; Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. .1985).
33. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
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parents, but did decide that evidence of a gay relationship was
a proper factor in determining the best interest of the child and
the parent's fitness.1 Finding that the mother's lesbian relation-
ship was not in itself enough to justify completely severing the
ties between the natural mother and her son,35 the court in Doe
attempted to balance its admiration for the natural mother's
dedication as a parent with its almost complete intolerance of
the mother's lesbian relationship. 6 The only reason on which the
court could have relied to deny custody was the mother's lesbian
relationship, as there was ample evidence of the mother's par-
enting skills.37 The court, finding no evidence of harm to the child
from the lesbian relationship,3 reversed the lower court's decision
to sever the lesbian mother's parental rights, as it found she was
a devoted and fit parent in all respects other than her sexual
orientation.39
Four years later, the Virginia Supreme Court decided in Roe
v. Roe'0 that a gay father's continuous homosexual relationship
rendered him unfit and an improper custodian as a matter of
law.41 As in Doe, the gay parent was found to be an otherwise
fit, devoted, and competent custodian.42 Unlike Doe, however, the
custody dispute was between two natural parents and Virginia
law required the court to determine the best interests of the
34. Id. at 806.
35. Id. The natural mother in Doe faced complete extinguishment of her parental
rights because the child's step-mother petitioned the court for adoption. Subsequent to a
divorce decree, the father and mother had joint custody of the child. The father and the
step-mother filed a petition for adoption primarily due to concern over the effect on the
boy of the mother's lesbian relationship. The trial court approved the adoption after
deciding that the consent of the natural mother was withheld contrary to the child's best
interest. Id. at 801.
36. The court closely examined the trial court's record and described the natural
mother as an "exceptionally well-educated, stable, responsible, and sensitive individual
... [who] exercised a selfless wisdom in caring for (her child]." Id. at 804. In contrast,
the court commented that, "[rlegardless of how offensive we may find [the mother's] life-
style, its effect on her son's welfare is not a matter of which we cdn take judicial notice."
Id. at 805 (emphasis added). The court concluded its decision by personally beseeching
the mother to terminate her lesbian relationship for the good of her son. Id at 806.
37. Id at 805.
38. Id. The court concluded that "[w]e take judicial notice of generally known or easily
ascertainable facts" and refused to speculate as to the effect of the relationship on the
child. Id. at 805 (citing Ryan v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 1978)).
39. Id. at 806.
40. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
41. Id. at 694.
42. Id. at 692.
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child. 3 In examining the child's best interests, the court con-
cluded, "[t~he conditions under which the child must live daily
... impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her
relationships with her peers and with the community at large.""
The court presumed future harm to the child from social stigma
despite a specific finding that there was no evidence that the
father's conduct had an adverse effect on the child. 5
In both Roe and Doe, the Virginia Supreme Court expressed
outrage at what it considered immoral conduct by the parent. 6
In both cases, the trial record did not indicate actual harm to
the child from the gay parent's relationship. 47 The difference in
outcomes appears to be best explained by the much lower stan-
dard in Roe, in which a natural parent had petitioned for custody' 8
The question in Doe was whether to permanently terminate any
substantive parental contact without evidence of parental unfit-
ness. 49 The issue in Roe was different; after removing the child
from the father's custody, the Virginia Supreme Court charged
the trial court with allowing the father visitation rights in accor-
dance with its decision.50 The different results in these two cases
turned on the Virginia Supreme Court's recognition of the dis-
tinction between transferring custody of a child and extinguishing
parental rights.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA DECISION
On June 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals of Virginia handed
down its decision in Bottoms v. Bottoms.5' Bottoms reversed the
43. Id. at 693. Virginia law requires that custody disputes be resolved by determining
which result will best serve the welfare of the child. VA. CODE ANN. SS 31-15 (Michie
1992), 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1994). The court in Roe refused to apply Doe, reasoning that
an adoption is permanent, whereas custody agreements are constantly supervised and
amended by the courts. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
44. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694. Apparently, the court chose not to apply the language of
the then recent decision, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that private racial
biases and possible injury from such biases are not permissible considerations for removal
of an infant child from the custody of her natural parent). See Pershing, mupra note 4,
at 305-06, for a discussion of Palmore's application to Bottoms.
45. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 692.
46. Id. at 694; Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Va. 1981).
47. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 692; Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805.
48. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
49. Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805. The court stated that "(t]he most drastic and far-reaching
action that can be taken by a court of equity is to enter a final order of adoption. Such
an order severing the ties between a parent and a child is ... final ... and . . . devastating."
Id.
50. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
51. 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
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decision of the circuit court regarding Sharon Bottoms' fitness
as a matter of law. 2 The court of appeals limited, but did not
completely eliminate, the application of Roe to custody cases
between a parent and a third partys By adopting Doe, Virginia
now requires a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation
and an adverse impact on the child; in embracing this standard,
Virginia has joined a growing majority of states.
A. The Court's Approach to the Lesbian Relationship
The court of appeals first reviewed the record for evidence of
Sharon's fitness as a parent, apart from her lesbian relationship. 65
Although Sharon may not be an ideal parent, the court found
that her conduct fell short of neglect or abuse sufficient to render
her an unfit custodian.56 After reviewing Sharon's conduct as a
52. Id. at 281 (citing Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 806).
53. The court did not entirely limit the application of Roe to custody disputes between
two parents. Some of the court's conclusions in Roe concerning the level of exposure of
a homosexual parent's relationship to his or her child may affect a trial court's deter-
mination of fitness in either a parent versus parent or a parent versus third party
dispute. See infra text accompanying notes 63-70.
54. Only two states, Virginia and Missouri, have found gay or lesbian parents per se
unfit. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). A
large number of states require a nexus, similar to the Bottoms standard, between the
parent's sexual orientation and an adverse impact on the child. See S.N.E. Y. R.L.B., 699
P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (requiring a nexus between a parent's homosexuality and an
adverse impact on the child); see also Birdsall v. Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024 (Ct. App.
1988); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); In re
Jacinta M., 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App.
Div. 1984); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); A. v. A., 514 P.2d 358
(Or. Ct. App. 1973); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); In re
Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); B.L.V.B. v. E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt.
1993) (requiring a connection between the sexual orientation of a parent and an adverse
effect on the child). A few states have created a rebuttable presumption that the gay or
lesbian parent has an adverse impact on the child. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d
510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (applying a rebuttable presumption of adverse impact on the
child); see also D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 find. Ct. App. 1981); Hall v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d
143 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v.
J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (applying a rebuttable presumption of adverse impact on the child). See generally
Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis,
102 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1989).
55. The court found that Sharon Bottoms had spanked her son "too hard" twice, swore
occasionally in Tyler's presence, made Tyler stand in the corner, and occasionally had
been slow in changing Tyler's diapers. The court also found that Sharon had lived in
four different residences and had four different relationships in three years, had not been
regularly employed, and left Tyler with Kay for a week without telling Kay how to get
in touch with her. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
56. "At all times, Sharon Bottoms either cared for the child or assured that proper
care was provided for the child." Id.
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parent, the court analyzed Sharon's lesbian relationship in light
of the Roe decision. First, the court rejected Kay's argument that
the Roe decision stood for the proposition that a gay or lesbian
parent is unfit per se.57 According to the court, the specific
language of Roe required an examination of the circumstances
surrounding the gay or lesbian parent before determining paren-
tal fitness.58 The court also distinguished Roe from the instant
case by examining the different legal standards applied to the
two custodial situations. 59 Under Virginia law, in a custody dis-
pute between two biological parents, a court is required to base
its custody decision on the child's best interests.0 Thus, in Roe,
the court awarded custody under the best interests standard
without ever deciding that the gay parent was unfit.61 In a
custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, however, a
different standard should be applied. The parent must be declared
unfit before the court may inquire into the best interests of the
child.62
Finally, the court distinguished the two cases on a factual basis
by comparing the level of exposure to intimate behavior between
the gay parent and partner.63 The court found similarities be-
tween the behavior of Sharon Bottoms and the father's behavior
in Roe; Sharon Bottoms had hugged, kissed, and displayed affec-
tion toward her partner in the presence of her child." Nonethe-
less, the court decided that Sharon Bottoms' conduct was more
acceptable than that of the father in Roe, whose daughter had
witnessed the father and his partner hugging, kissing, and sleep-
ing in bed together.65 According to Roe, the daughter was dis-
tressed at seeing such conduct by her father and other individuals
57. Id. at 283.
58. Id. "Although we declineg, to hold that every lesbian mother or homosexual father
is per se an unfit parent,.... [this) father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral
and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law."
Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
59. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283.
60. Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1977).
61. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94; Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283.
62. "[Tihe presumption of parental fitness must be rebutted before a court may
consider whether a third party would be a fit or proper custodian." Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d
at 280 (citing Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581. 583 (Va. 1973)). See supra notes 23-
31 and accompanying text.
63. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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at her father's residence. 66 The record in Bottoms contained no
evidence of illegal activities committed in Tyler's presence and
no evidence of emotional or psychological harm to Tyler.67 The
court distinguished the actions in the two cases by the level of
exposure to intimate sexual behavior.
The court's analysis indicates a sliding scale of "outness," or
homosexual behavior, that a gay or lesbian parent may display
to his or her child.8 Although the proper level of intimate contact
to which a child should be exposed is an open question, the court
expressed strong reservations about contact that probably would
be ignored in a heterosexual relationship For example, the
decision points to the fact that Sharon "displayed some affection
toward her lesbian partner." 70 It seems unlikely that a court
would even note a display of affection between heterosexual
partners.
B. The Court's Approach to the Sodomy Issue
The court in Bottoms reduced, but did not eliminate, the neg-
ative impact of evidence of gay or lesbian consensual intercourse
in violation of Virginia's sodomy law.7 ' The court disagreed with
the trial court's conclusion that evidence of a violation of the
sodomy law by a lesbian or gay parent, without evidence of harm
to the child, overcomes the presumption of parental fitness. 72 In
making this determination, the court relied on Ford v. Ford3 and
Sutherland v. Sutherland.74 Both Ford and Sutherland found that
66. The evidence in Roe cited by the court in Bottoms is from the mother's petition
for a temporary restraining order. Id.; Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Va. 1985). The
distress of the child in Roe is noted only in the mother's petition. Id. The court in Roe
made a finding of a lack of emotional harm from the gay parent's conduct. Id. The
behavior condemned in Roe is the child's knowledge that the two men shared a bedroom
and the child's exposure to men hugging and patting each other on the behind. Id. at
693. In contrast to the court's finding, the behavior of the same sex couples in front of
the children in both cases appears almost identical. Id.; Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283.
67. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283.
68. "Where a parent exposes a child to an illicit sexual relationship, as in Roe, the
Supreme Court has upheld denying a parent custody; however, where the parents shielded
the child from illegal heterosexual adultery, as in the Ford and Sutherland cases, we
have held the parents not to be unfit." Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 281. "A parent's private sexual conduct, even if illegal, does not create a
presumption of unfitness." Id. at 282; see infra note 77.
72. Id. at 281-82.
73. 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
74. 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
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a heterosexual parent's violation of Virginia's adultery statute is
only one factor that the court should consider in making a custody
determination.75 The court in Bottoms held that "proof that the
parent is engaged in private, illegal sexual conduct or conduct
considered by some to be deviant, in the absence of proof that
such behavior or activity poses a substantial threat of harm to
a child's emotional, psychological, or physical well being" will not
justify removal of a child from the custody of her natural parent.78
The reference to "deviant behavior" may indicate that the
same close scrutiny would not apply to a heterosexual parent
who violated the sodomy law 7  A further indication that the
court in Bottoms was more concerned with same sex sodomy than
heterosexual sexual misconduct is the court's failure to criticize
the trial judge's obvious bias in applying the sodomy law to
Sharon Bottoms without applying the lewd and lascivious cohab-
itation statute to Kay Bottoms.78 If the premise is that violation
of the various state morality statutes by parents may produce
harm to the child, silence toward the heterosexual couple's moral
failings does not indicate an evenhanded approach. The Bottoms
decision prohibits Virginia trial courts from automatically remov-
ing a child from a gay or lesbian parent upon presentation of
75. Ford, 419 S.E.2d at 417; Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
76. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 282.
77. See Pershing, supra note 4, at 295 (noting anti-gay bias in examinations of sexual
conduct). The Virginia sodomy law applies equally to. both heterosexual and homosexual
intercourse. The statute provides that "if any person ... carnally knows any male or
female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal
knowledge, he or she will be guilty of a Class 6 felony." VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-361 (Michie
1993). A survey of sex practices among heterosexual couples found that 90% of couples
have engaged in fellatio and 93% have engaged in cunnilingus. PHILLIP BLUMSTE' &
PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 236 (1983).
78. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-345 (Michie 1993) (providing that any persons, not married
to each other, who lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together are guilty of a
class 1 misdemeanor). The record indicates that Kay Bottoms was cohabiting with a
boyfriend during the time that she cared for Tyler and for seventeen years in which she
reared Sharon. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 278-79. While the lewd and lascivious cohabitation
offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony, this distinction is not critical. Sodomy is
a class six felony, VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-361 (Michie 1993), and lewd and lascivious
cohabitation is a class one misdemeanor, VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-345 (Michie 1993). In
Virginia, a class six felony is punishable by incarceration of between one and five years,
or incarceration of less than one year or a fine of less than $2500, or both. VA. CODE
ANN. S 18.2-10(f) (Michie Supp. 1994). The punishment for a class one misdemeanor is the
same as the alternative sentence for a class six felony: incarceration of not more than a
year or a fine of not more than $2500, or both. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-11(a) (Michie Supp.
1994). See Pershing, supra note 4, at 296 ("Not surprisingly, there are no reported
domestic relations decisions in which a heterosezual parent has been denied custody or
any other parental right based on a sodomy or similar statute.").
BOTTOMS v. BOTTOMS
credible evidence of a violation of the sodomy law.79 The Bottoms
decision is consistent with a number of decisions from other
states that require a showing of adverse impact on the child from
a gay or lesbian parent in a custody dispute, despite sodomy
statutes that proscribe intimate contact between same sex cou-
ples.80 Whether Virginia courts will treat same sex sexual issues
in custody disputes in the same manner as analogous heterosexual
issues remains to be seen.
HI. CONCLUSION
The Bottoms decision does not represent the final word on
lesbian custody rights in Virginia. Bottoms is similar to Doe in
its willingness to accept evidence of harm to the child from
homosexual relationships. In both decisions, a Virginia court
allowed a lesbian mother to retain custody of her child despite
strong reservations about her lesbian relationship. In both deci-
sions, the person attempting to take custody away from the
lesbian parent put forth very little direct or scientific evidence
of harm to the child from the parent's lesbian relationship. Future
litigation on this issue may revolve around conflicting scientific
evidence, as each side calls a parade of experts who will testify
to the harm, or lack thereof, to the child.81 The issue of gay or
lesbian parental unfitness as a matter of law is dead, but the
issue of actual harm to the child may have a long and eventful
life in Virginia.
79. Bottoms 444 S.E.2d at 283.
80. See Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983); see also D.C. CODE ANN. S
16-911(aX5) (1981) (stating that sexual orientation is not dispositive in determining custody);
D.C. CODE ANN. S 16-914(a) (1981) (stating that sexual orientation is not dispositive in
determining visitation rights; these statutes were enforced concurrently with the District's
sodomy law until September 19, 1993, when the sodomy law was repealed); Stroman v.
Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that adverse effect on the child is
the critical factor).
81. Donna Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Custody Cases:
The Use of Expert Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451 (1978).
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